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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF Ac-
CESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
The Globe Newspaper Company (Globe) made an unsuccess-
ful attempt to gain access to a rape trial conducted in a Massachu-
setts Superior Court. The trial judge closed the courtroom relying
on a Massachusetts statute' that required trial judges to exclude the
general public in cases of sexual offenses involving a victim under
the age of eighteen. The defendant in this case had been charged
with the forcible rape of three minor females.
Globe made a motion requesting that the trial court revoke the
closure order but it was denied. Injunctive relief was then requested
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and that request
was also denied. Globe appealed to the United States Supreme
Court which remanded for consideration in light of the Court's
holding in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,2 a case establish-
ing that the press has a first amendment constitutional right of ac-
cess to criminal trials. Again Globe was denied relief, and on
appeal from that decision the United States Supreme Court re-
versed. The United States Supreme Court conceded that the State's
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors was compelling. However, it held that the mandatory-clo-
sure statute was overly broad and not sufficiently tailored to the
State's interest to withstand a first amendment attack. The Court
further held that the statute violated the first amendment3 of the
United States Constitution. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
Open public trials are part of the common law tradition.
Before the Norman Conquest, cases in England were brought before
I. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981), provides in pertinent part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon,
with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed,. . . the presid-
ing justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting only
such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
2. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . ... "
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local courts and attended by the free men of the community.4 At
first, such attendance was mandatory,5 but even after this duty was
released it appears criminal trials remained public. 6
In 1829 the King's Bench in Daubney v. Cooper,7 acknowledg-
ing the public's right to be present for the purpose of hearing what
goes on, declared the presumptive openness of the trial as one of the
essential qualities of a court of justice. Early records in colonial
America suggest that the presumptive openness of criminal trials8
was an early feature and became a standard attribute of the Ameri-
can judicial system.9 The openness of trials was expressly recog-
nized as part of the fundamental law of the colonies in some
instances.'0 Researchers have been "unable to find any English or
American cases since 1641 in which a trial occurred in total
secrecy." "1
A public interest is recognized by both state 12 and federal 13
4. Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 88, 89-90 (1968).
5. Id. at 89-90.
6. "[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are
held in open court, to which the public have free access, . .. appears to have been the rule
in England from time immemorial .... "E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74
(6th ed. 1967).
7. 10 B. & C. 237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K. B. 1829).
8. This note involves only criminal and not civil trials. The reason, as expressed by
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Globe, is that the manner in which criminal
trials are conducted is of such great importance to the people.
9. See A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 128-29 (1930).
10. See generally 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey providing:
That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any per-
son or persons, inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend
the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there
had or passed, that justice may not be done in a comer nor in any covert
manner ...
Reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959). The Pennsylvania Frame
of Government of 1682 also provided "[tihat all courts shall be open .... " Id at 217. See
also I B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129, 140, 271
(1971).
11. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1961).
12. Nearly every state that has considered the issue has recognized that the public has a
strong interest in maintaining open trials. Most of these cases involved state constitutional
provisions modeled on the sixth amendment where the public trial right is phrased in terms
of a guarantee to the accused. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mobley, 157 Ala. 408, 411-12, 47 So. 590,
592 (1908); Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 93-96, 553 S.W.2d 270, 273-74
(1977); Lincoln v. Denver Post, 31 Colo. App. 283, 285-86, 501 P.2d 152, 154 (1972); Gannett
Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 230-31, 580 P.2d 49, 55 (1978); State v. Beaudoin,
386 A.2d 731, 733 (Me. 1978); Cox v. State, 3 Md. App. 136, 139-40, 238 A.2d 157, 158-59
(1968); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 86-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806-07 (1966); State v. Keeler,
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courts in maintaining open trials. Public access to criminal trials
provides an opportunity to observe the criminal justice system, and
affords citizens a form of legal education that hopefully encourages
a more positive attitude about the system.' 4 Open trials provide an
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion, supporting a
"significant community therapeutic value."' 5 Public access to trials
increases respect for the law and the judicial system, 16 enhances the
integrity and quality of proceedings within the courtroom" and pro-
motes confidence in the fair administration of justice.' 8 The judge,
the jury and the lawyers are all under public scrutiny which is seen
by many as tending to insure the fairness of the trial.' 9
In addition to a generally recognized public interest, the public
has the right to be informed about what occurs in the courtroom.E"
"In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the
First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees."21
52 Mont. 205, 218-19, 156 P. 1080, 1083-84 (1916); Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene District
Court, 117 N.H. 959, 962-63, 380 A.2d 261, 263-64 (1977); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 157-60,
373 A.2d 377, 389-90 (1977); Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 289, 192 P.2d 294, 297 (1948);
State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 382-85, 224 P.2d 500, 508-09 (1950). Cf English v. McCrary,
348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852-54 (3d Cir. 1978); Stami-
carbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 540-42 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir.
1965).
14. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 525 (reprint New York 1978)
(London 1827); 6 J. WIGMORE, Evidence § 1834, at 438 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
15. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570. See also I J. BENTHAM, supra note 14, at
522-25.
16. "Conducting trials behind closed doors might engender an apprehension and dis-
trust of the legal system which would, in the end, destroy its ability to peacefully settle
disputes." United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also People
v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894) (agreeing that the doors of the courtroom should
be kept open and that the public is entitled to be admitted).
17. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
18. State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 87-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966).
19. "Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all
other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might
present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks
than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance." I J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827); see also Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime
and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1961).
20. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965). See also id at 583-84 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). The court ruled, however, that televising the criminal trial over the defendant's
objection violated his due process right to a fair trial.
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
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However, today people often depend on representatives of the me-
dia to distribute information. Accordingly, the right to attend trials
may be exercised by people less frequently today when information
about trials is generally available to them through print and elec-
tronic media.22 This in no way alters the basic right. 3 Our modem
democratic society demands that the press communicate the activi-
ties occurring in the courts for public evaluation of the fairness of
our judicial system.24
Historically, two rights have been considered in the discussion
of public trials: a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a
public trial25 and the first amendment right to access held by the
press.6 In early trials the criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right, instead of the first amendment right of the press, had been the
one protected in cases involving exclusion of the public.2 1 "[Tihe
public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment is a 'guarantee to an
accused' designed to safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution. This sixth amendment
guarantee of a public trial apparently confers no special benefit on
the press.2 9
Decisions involving exclusion orders developed into three cate-
gories over the years. The first category of decisions excluded the
public and press, allowing only those connected with the case to re-
main.30 The second category excluded the general public but per-
mitted the press to remain.3 All of the cases in these two categories
22. Id. at 572.
23. Id at 577 n.12.
24. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ....
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
27. Infra note 32.
28. Estes, 381 U.S. at 583 (Warren, C.J. concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
266, 270 (1948)).
29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI speaks of the rights of the accused, not of the press or
anyone else; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 583.
30. See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964
(1967); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86
S.W.2d 931 (1935); People v. Swafford, 65 Cal. 223, 3 P. 809 (1884); State v. Callahan, 100
Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907); Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S.W. 631 (1886).
31. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aft'd, 262
F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457,
172 P. 273 (1918); State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 251 A.2d 178 (1968),cert. denied, 395 U.S.
928 (1969); Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921); Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324
Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949).
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allowed some form of exclusion, and the courts said the defendant's
sixth amendment right to a public trial was not violated by the ex-
clusion. A third category of decisions developed where both types
of exclusion orders allowed in categories one and two were over-
ruled because they violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right.32
In the first category of decisions, which exclude the general
public and the press, several reasons for allowing exclusion have
been given. Audiences may become disorderly and warrant exclu-
sion 33 or spectators may be so obtrusive that the witness is embar-
rassed.34 If the crime committed was of a sexual nature the public
has been excluded during testimony of a particular witness. 3 Be-
cause of the age and emotional condition of the witness, 36 in both
state and federal courts, closing the courtroom is an accepted prac-
tice when details of a sexual crime must be revealed by a minor.37
The Eighth Circuit has allowed exclusion of public and press in a
rape prosecution during the victim's testimony.38 The Supreme
Court of the United States has either denied certiorari or not re-
viewed those cases involving complete exclusion and the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right.3 9
32. See, e.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); Davis v. United States,
247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); Stewart v. State, 18 Ala. App. 622, 93 So. 274 (1922); People v.
Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894); People v. Letoile, 31 Cal. App. 166, 159 P. 1057
(1916); Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908); People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228,
71 N.W. 491 (1897); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
351 N.E.2d 127 (1976); E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896
(1955); Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294 (1948); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289,
103 P. 62 (1909).
33. Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S.W. 631 (1886) (when audiences become so
disorderly so as to prevent the regular process of the trial, the benefit of their presence is
outweighed by the burden of their disorderliness).
34. State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907). See also Reagan v. United
States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913) (defendant in a rape prosecution was not deprived of a
public trial by an order clearing the courtroom of spectators but permitting all persons con-
nected with the case to remain).
35. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967);
Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935).
36. Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935). The public was excluded from
the courtroom for ten minutes during the examination of a ten-year-old prosecuting witness
who, while previously on the stand, made an unsatisfactory witness because she was fright-
ened, embarrassed and humiliated because of the crowd's presence.
37. Harris, 361 F.2d at 891; Hogan, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931.
38. Harris, 361 F.2d 888.
39. Harris, 361 F.2d 888; Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Hogan,
191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931; State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907); Grim-
mett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S.W. 631 (1886).
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The second category of decisions, which exclude the general
public but allow the press to remain, has also been upheld by the
courts.' As early as 1918, public attendance in an Arizona state
court was restricted to newspaper reporters.4 In this context, the
Massachusetts statute cited in Globe, which allowed exclusion of the
public in cases involving sex crimes committed against a minor, has
been upheld as constitutional.42 Limited exclusions have been al-
lowed to protect the victim of a sexual crime from further embar-
rassment and possible psychological harm. However, those who
have a substantial interest in the proceeding may be allowed to re-
main.43 Spectators have been excluded with the exception of those
who were members of the press, members of the bar, or relatives or
close friends of the defendant or minor witnesses." The trend evi-
denced by these cases allows exclusion of the general public in trials
involving sexual crimes in which the victim's testimony may be of a
sensitive nature. Generally, the press has been allowed to remain in
the courtroom when a partial exclusion is ordered.45
The third category of decisions highlights the individual sixth
amendment right of the defendant. An 1894 case46 found unconsti-
40. See cases cited supra note 31.
41. Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 P. 273 (1918) (involved a prosecution for
contributing to the dependency [sic] of a minor where it was obvious that indecent language
would be repeated and she would be subjected to a gruelling cross-examination).
42. Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 984 (1950). However, the press was not excluded in this case and the court did not
decide whether the statute could be interpreted as permitting such exclusion.
43. United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1076 (1978).
44. United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, (D. Alaska), afTd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959) (exclusion proper in a rape trial where prosecutrix
was nine years old and two other witnesses were girls seven and eleven years of age). State
v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 251 A.2d 178 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969) (a limited
exclusion of the public from the courtroom was permissible when a sixteen year old girl was
called to testify to all the details of a particularly violent rape). See also Moore v. State, 151
Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921), appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 702 (1922) (trial judge may clear the
courtroom during examination in a rape trial when the victim, on account of her youth and
highly nervous condition, is unable to give her testimony before a crowd of spectators).
United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 693-94 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978). The press and others with a substantial interest in knowing
what transpired were permitted to remain in the courtroom. Petitioners, appealing from an
Illinois court order excluding them, were seeking habeas corpus relief on the ground that
their right to a public trial was denied by exclusion of spectators during testimony of the
twenty-one year old victim. The judge justified exclusion as a protection of the personal
dignity of the complaining witness, making it clear that members of the press were welcome
to stay.
45. Supra note 44.
46. People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153, (1894); see also People v. Yeager, 113
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tutional an order that excluded all persons except the defendant and
officers of the court. The order was considered error because it vio-
lated the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial. In the
early 1900's, an order excluding the public from the courtroom dur-
ing a criminal trial, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, was
presumed to have prejudiced the defendant. 7 Other cases during
the early 1900's held that the exclusion of everyone not connected
with the case, without any reason other than that the testimony re-
lated to matters ordinarily too indecent to be mentioned, and over
the objection of the defendant, was an abuse of discretion and vio-
lated defendant's right to a public trial.4 8 During the mid-1900's,
courts continued to hold certain exclusion orders unconstitutional
because they denied the defendant his right to a public trial.49
Moreover, some courts have held that orders excluding the public
generally but allowing the press to remain deny the defendant his
sixth amendment right. A distinction is made when exclusion or-
ders are more restrictive in their application and have not been
found to violate defendant's right to a public trial. ° More recently
the focus has begun to shift from the individual right of the defend-
ant to the right of the press and public to know.5 For example, in
Ohio, an order excluding the press from a judicial hearing and
prohibiting news reports of what would transpire at the hearing was
not upheld because the order abridged the freedom of the press.5 2
Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897) (order in rape trial excluding all persons not legitimately
interested in the case (defendant did not object), excepting members of the press and friends
of defendant, held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be a denial of defendant's sixth
amendment right to a public trial).
47. State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 295-97, 103 P. 62, 64-66 (1909).
48. Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908). See also Davis v. United States,
247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917) (reversed and remanded a case in which the lower court excluded
members of the public with the exception of relatives of defendant, members of the bar and
newspaper reporters); People v. Letoile, 31 Cal. App. 166, 159 P. 1057 (1916) (in trial involv-
ing incest the court said the judge does not have the right to wholly exclude the public).
49. Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294 (1948). See also United States v.
Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125
N.E.2d 896 (1955).
50. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949). See also E.W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955) (when sole ground for total exclusion of
public from pandering trial was request of defendant based on claim that they might be able
to compel state witness to tell the truth on cross-examination, exclusion order was without
legal foundation and judge would be prohibited from enforcing it).
51. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Mills v. Alabama 384
U.S. 214 (1966); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351
N.E.2d 127 (1976).




This shift in emphasis is unusual and the reasons for the shift are
vague and unclear. Although the first amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits Congress from making laws abridging
the freedom of the press, the right of the press to access to criminal
trials is not explicitly protected. The Supreme Court has, however,
found that this right is implied. 3 The reasoning utilized to bridge
the gap between express and implied rights of access is that it is
necessary to maintain the first amendment interest "in protect[ing]
the free discussion of governmental affairs."54 News gathering qual-
ifies for first amendment protection because, without a source from
which to obtain information, the protected right to publish the news
would be of little value.5
The issue involving the first amendment right of access to the
courtroom held by the press has not been litigated by lower courts
because most of the courts were awaiting an instructive decision of
the United States Supreme Court.5 6 In Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart57 the Court discussed the possible conflict between a state's
interest in assuring criminal defendants a fair and impartial trial
and the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. 8 The
issue, however, was not resolved in Stuart. The Court did not di-
rectly begin to discuss the connection between general first amend-
ment protections and the right of access held by the press until 1979
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.5 9 In this case the Court implied that it
might recognize a first amendment right of access to members of the
53. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[F]irst Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government
from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.");
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right to receive information and ideas is funda-
mental to our free society); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (press rights are
protected under first amendment by viewing the press as an instrument for implementing the
general public's first amendment interest in newsworthy matters). Cf. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (Court implied that it might recognize a first amendment
right of access to criminal trials, but that issue was not actually decided). See generally
Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right ofPublic Access to Judicial Proceedings,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978).
54. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Court held an Alabama statute making
it a crime to solicit votes on election day in support of or in opposition to any proposition
being voted on during that day violated the first amendment guaranty of freedom of speech
and press.
55. State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 459-60, 351
N.E.2d 127, 129-30 (1976).
56. The decision came in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
57. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
58. Id at 547. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-11, at 625
(1978).
59. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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press and public to attend criminal trials, but expressly reserved de-
cision on that issue.60
Other cases dealing with the first amendment right of access did
not involve criminal trials. Two Supreme Court decisions in 197461
and one in 197862 upheld prison regulations which prohibited news
reporters from conducting personal interviews with specific prison
inmates who were willing to be interviewed. In Pell v. Procunier,63
the Court said the "newsmen have no constitutional right of access
to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general pub-
lic."' 64 The Supreme Court later qualified this denial of access in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia ,65 holding that penal institu-
tions do not share the long tradition of openness held by criminal
trials and are institutions where public access is generally limited.66
Not until 1980, in Richmond Newspapers, did the Supreme
Court directly address the question of whether the right of the pub-
lic and press to attend criminal trials was guaranteed under the
United States Constitution.67 The Court concluded that the right
was guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments68 and
that "absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of
a criminal case must be open to the public." 69
After Richmond Newspapers recognized a constitutional right of
the press to attend trials, the Court was then presented, in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,7° with the question of whether a
statute containing a mandatory-closure provision for certain types
of trials unconstitutionally violated this right.
In Globe, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, recognized
that Richmond Newspapers was the first decision to expressly hold
that the press and general public have a constitutional right of ac-
60. The issue in Gannett was whether members of the public have an independent con-
stitutional right to insist upon access to a pretrial judicial proceeding. The Court stated that
the constitutional guarantee of a public trial was for the benefit of the defendant. Discussion
of a possible first amendment right of access was present but the Court refused to decide that
issue. Gannett, 43 U.S. at 392.
61. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
62. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
63. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
64. Id. at 834.
65. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
66. Id at 576 n.ll.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id at 580.
69. Id. at 581.
70. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
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cess to criminal trials embodied in the first amendment. 7' The
Court also reaffirmed that, although this right is not explicitly
stated, it is necessary for the enjoyment of other first amendment
rights.72 A major purpose of the first amendment was "to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs, 73 allowing individual
citizens to participate in our system of government. The right of
access to criminal trials included in the first amendment ensures that
this constitutionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs"
is an informed one.74
The Court cited two basic reasons why a right of access to crim-
inal trials is protected under the first amendment. First, historically,
criminal trials have been open to the press and general public.75
Second, the right of access enhances the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess by fostering the appearance of fairness and allowing the public
to participate more in the process by serving as a check on the sys-
tem. 76 Participation elevates the level of respect held by the public
for the judicial process. The Court conceded that this right of access
is not absolute. However, the majority continued, a denial of access
must be necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest, and not merely to inhibit disclo-
sure of sensitive information.77
Massachusetts enumerated two interests served by the statute:
first, the protection of minor victims from further trauma and em-
barrassment and second, the encouragement of minor victims to
come forward and testify.78 The Court conceded that the first inter-
est was a compelling one but was not convinced that a mandatory-
closure statute, barring the press in all cases of this type, was neces-
sary.79 The Court proposed that the state's interest could be met as
effectively by trial court determination on a case-by-case basis of the
necessity of closure in order to protect the welfare of the minor vic-
tim. This approach, if properly applied, would not deny the right of
access to the press unless it was necessary to protect a compelling
state interest.8" The second concern of Massachusetts was consid-
71. Id at 2618.
72. Id. at 2619.
73. Id. at 2619 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id. at 2620.
77. Id
78. Id. at 2620-21.
79. Id. at 2621.
80. Id at 2621-22.
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ered speculative and not supported in empirical terms, according to
the majority. The statute did not seem to be tailored to meet this
second concern because, according to the opinion, the press is not
denied access to the transcript or other sources where the victim's
testimony could be obtained. If secrecy is the key in encouraging
these victims to come forward, then the statute is not effective to-
ward that end.8' The majority concluded that the Massachusetts
statute, section 16A, violated the first amendment to the
Constitution.82
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
contending that the historical practice of courts is exactly the oppo-
site of the majority's claims. Burger stated that "[tjhere is clearly a
long history of exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual
assaults, particularly those against minors."8 3 The dissenters bal-
anced the minimal impact which section 16A has on the first
amendment right of access, since the information can be obtained
from other sources,84 and the interest Massachusetts has in protect-
ing the minor victims of sexual crimes.85 The dissent firmly sup-
ported the state's interest and contended that the risk of severe
psychological damage, caused by having to relate the details of such
a crime publicly, justified the statute.86 Further, if the closure proce-
dure were handled on a case-by-case basis, as suggested by the ma-
jority, the determination would be left to the "idiosyncrasies of
individual judges subject to the pressures available to the media."87
The statute declared unconstitutional in Globe required trial
judges to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom
during trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under
the age of eighteen. Statutes in other states allow exclusion but do
81. Id at 2622.
82. Id Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in a separate opinion expressing
that the Court's decision should not carry any implications outside the context of criminal
trials. Id at 2623.
83. Id. at 2624. The dissenters cited Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, (D. Alaska), a'd,
262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Reagan v. United States, 202
F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935); State v. Purvis,
157 Conn. 198, 251 A.2d 178 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); Moore v. State, 151
Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921), appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 702 (1922). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 35-39.
84. E.g., trial transcript; but cf. supra note 19.
85. 102 S. Ct. at 2625.
86. Id at 2626.
87. Id at 2627.
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not require it.88 Based on the reasoning in Globe, these statutes
would withstand a constitutional attack. Presumably, the judge
would use his own discretion in granting exclusion orders on a case-
by-case basis. Standards to be used in deciding whether an exclu-
sion order should be issued are not spelled out, however. Future
exclusion orders may be challenged by the press based on the consti-
tutionality of the statute; but, it is unclear whether a challenge will
be successful on the basis of a single exclusion order or if several
exclusion orders would be necessary to show that the statute is being
applied unconstitutionally.
Another question left undecided by Globe is the scope of the
right to access claimed by the press. The press may conceivably ar-
gue that the right should extend beyond criminal trials to civil
cases,8 9 even to pretrial hearings9" and other governmental informa-
tion. Almost certainly the time will come when it will be necessary
to decide where to draw the line.
Finally, the courts must balance the interest of the individual
defendant in receiving a fair trial with the interests of the public in
scrutinizing the criminal process to insure its fairness for all defend-
ants. Presently no factors have been set out by the United States
Supreme Court as a basis for such a balancing process. Publicity
may sometimes be prejudicial to an individual defendant both
before and during the trial proceedings. Society will indicate by the
direction taken in the future which value or interest is more impor-
tant. If any imbalance exists, it is presently in favor of the public's
right to know.
C Lyn Peeples
88. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-202 (1975); ARiZ. R. CRIM. P. 9.3 (1973); GA. CODE
17-8-53 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West 1981); Miss. CONST., art. 3, § 26;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:8 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-7-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN., title 12, § 1901 (1973); WIs. STAT. § 970.03(4) (West Supp.
1982). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.16 (West Supp. 1983) (providing for mandatory
exclusion of general public but not press during testimony of minor victims).
89. See, e.g., supra notes 8 and 82.
90. See, e.g., supra note 60.
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